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Executive Summary 
Results-based financing (RBF) initiatives, which operate within the much larger financial and programming 
contexts of health systems, aim to expand coverage, improve quality and reduce consumer financial 
obligations at the country level in line with a nation’s decision to progress toward universal health coverage. 
RBF programs have the potential to ensure that clients’ needs for quality services are met through use of 
strategic incentives in health care provision and promoting more client-centered healthcare systems. 
Performance-based financing (PBF) programs are considered a specific subset of RBF initiatives and are 
distinguished by a focus on monetary incentives to healthcare providers for achieving agreed performance 
measure under certain conditions. While both PBF, which uses financial disbursements to incentivize health 
service delivery and quality, and rights-based programming have informed at different times efforts to 
strengthen and scale FP services, there is has been little done to understand the linkages between PBF and a 
rights-based approach (RBA) to FP services. To address this gap, a review of performance-based financing 
(PBF) operations manuals was undertaken together with an analysis of PBF indicators relevant to FP services. 
This paper reviews country-generated PBF operational documents to assess whether existing FP indicators 
are sensitive to the principles associated with an RBA.  
As the result of an evidence mapping via consultation with the PBF community of practice, the review 
identified 23 PBF operational and assessed the sensitivity of FP services in those PBF programs to eight 
rights principles recognized by the World Health Organization. The review found that rights were not 
uniformly represented across the 23 PBF programs. The most commonly identified rights principles- 
accountability and quality – are features of most FP services in the 23 PBF programs identified in this review. 
Less commonly represented rights included accessibility, acceptability, and informed choice. None of the 23 
programs spoke to agency / voluntarism in their FP services.   
From the review of operational and implementation manuals produced in-country, this report demonstrates 
that current PBF programs are not designed with a rights-based approach and that PBF guidelines could 
better reflect the importance of patient-centered, rights-based programming. Given the mixed evidence for 
PBF benefits, concerns about poor country ownership of PBF programs, and a risk of perverse incentives in 
early versions of PBF programs that did not take have a systematic alignment with rights-based approaches, 
greater attention to the rights principles of acceptability, accessibility, availability, and quality; accountability; 
agency and empowerment; equity and non-discrimination; informed choice and decision-making; 
participation; and privacy and confidentiality would improve health service delivery and health system 
performance for all stakeholders with consumers at the center.  
Key recommendations include the need to assess the rights principles gaps in current PBF programs; build 
consensus on integrating rights principles into PBF trainings, program design, and implementation; and 
launch an iterative learning agenda to improve the operationalization of rights principles in PBF programs.  
From the results presented here, there is a clear opportunity for PBF programs to more explicitly and 
systematically address rights principles. How rights principles are incorporated into implementation will 
require a thoughtful, iterative approach that accounts for contextual variation. Determining the programmatic 
structure of a fully operational rights-based approach in any PBF program is guided by international 
agreement on a rights principles framework for family planning programs as well as local stakeholder 
contextualization in the respective health system. 
Given its centrality to funding through the GFF partners, PBF for FP services will have significant 
implications on the abilities of women and couples to choose if, when, and how many children to bear in 
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their lifetimes. Placing consumers at the heart of services and ensuring they are always prioritized and 
protected when designing, planning, and implementing PBF programs is critical to ensuring that people are 
able to make their own decisions about FP use and to sustaining PBF programs, particularly in countries 
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Introduction 
BACKGROUND 
Expanding access to and use of voluntary family planning (FP) services is a well-established global health 
goal-- it is a specific target under the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of good health and well-being, an 
integral component of Every Woman Every Child (EWEC), and the overall objective of the Family Planning 
2020 (FP2020) partnership, among other initiatives (United Nations, n.d.; Every Woman Every Child, 2016; 
Family Planning 2020, 2017). FP2020, the global partnership to achieve the ambitious goal of increasing 
access to voluntary FP for an additional 120 million users, supports and encourages voluntary FP policies and 
programs that focus on ensuring individuals and couples can freely and responsibly decide the number and 
spacing of children, with the aid of quality voluntary FP information and services and without facing 
discrimination (Family Planning 2020, 2018). However, significant barriers inhibit many people from using 
voluntary FP services to help meet their reproductive intentions. An indication of this is the estimated 214 
million women who want to delay having more children or have born the children they want to have but are 
not using contraception (Guttmacher Institute, 2017).  
One promising approach for achieving global voluntary FP goals is performance-based financing (PBF), 
which deploys financial incentives to the health system to improve service availability, utilization, and quality 
as well as addressing some public financial management bottlenecks by directly targeting resources to facilities 
based on performance. Described below, PBF falls under the broader and related rubric of results-based 
financing (RBF), which includes performance-based incentives (PBI) and pay for performance (P4P), as well 
as demand-side initiatives like vouchers (Musgrove, 2011). PBF is one of the financing instruments used by 
the recently created Global Financing Facility in support of Every Women Every Child (GFF). Housed at the 
World Bank, GFF is a partnership of funders, technical agencies, civil society organizations, and private 
sector entities focused on women and child health.  
PBF programs, operating within the much larger financial contexts of health systems, aim to expand 
coverage, improve quality, and reduce consumer financial obligations in line with progress toward universal 
health coverage (Kutzin, 2013; Wagstaff et al., 2015). Although the evidence is mixed, some PBF and RBF 
studies have shown significant positive effects, including expanding coverage, lowering costs, increasing value 
for money, and increasing the overall efficiency and quality of health systems (Basinga et al., 2011; Bellows, 
Askew, & Bellows, 2014; Bertone, Lagarde, & Witter, 2016; Blacklock et al., 2016; Grittner, 2013; Soeters et 
al., 2011). At the same time, there is a move towards operationalizing rights-based approaches in health 
services and programs to better meet clients’ needs and the state’s obligations (Family Planning 2020, 2014; 
Hardee, Kumar, et al., 2014; WHO, 2014). PBF programs have the potential to ensure that a client-centered 
approach is upheld through use of strategic incentives in healthcare provision that promote quality of care, 
informed choice, and voluntarism, among other program attributes. Thus far, however, family planning 
services in PBF programs have often been supported via incentives for enrolling new contraceptive users or 
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There are questions about the suitability of PBF for family planning services due to the potential for perverse 
incentivizing, e.g. offering “rewards” for achieving contracted outputs could have unanticipated or 
undesirable effects. These may include (a) health service actors ignoring unincentivized health interventions 
or cherry-picking services that pay the highest incentives, (b) inducing superfluous demand for incentivized 
services, and (c) fraudulent reporting although World Bank funded studies have not reported these types of 
adverse events to date (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Paul et al., 2018a; Kandpal, 2016).  
Rewarding certain behaviors and setting certain kinds of targets can encourage actions that infringe on clients’ 
autonomous and informed decision-making. Financial rewards can affect how providers share information 
with clients, alter privacy and confidentiality protections, and induce changes in the patient-provider 
relationship through structural and procedural biases (Eichler, Levine, & The Performance-Based Incentives 
Working Group, 2009; Eichler et al., 2010). At worst under PBF, providers could pressure clients into taking 
any given services (Hardee, Harris, et al., 2014).  The World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended 
that: 
“In settings where PBF occurs, a system of checks and balances 
should be in place, including assurance of non-coercion... If PBF 
occurs, research should be conducted to evaluate its effectiveness and 
its impact on clients in terms of increasing contraceptive availability” 
(WHO, 2014) 
Where family planning is concerned, significant efforts have been made to ensure that patient autonomy and 
protection are foremost in service delivery. 
PURPOSE 
Given the confluence of potential benefits of PBF to expand access to and improve quality of FP services, 
the potential risks for perverse provider incentives, and the global imperative to implement rights-based 
approaches to health programs, this paper reviews country-generated PBF operational documents to 
determine whether and the extent to which rights principles are currently considered and included in PBF 
program designs. The report focuses on the current state of operational and performance measures specific 
to FP services within PBF programs, identifying whether and how these principles are embedded in these 
financial schemes, now often cofinanced under the new GFF. Acknowledging that the documents that form 
the evidence of this review largely pre-date the GFF, the report is an opportunity to learn from what went 
before and iteratively improve from lessons to be drawn here.  
What is performance-based financing? 
Performance-based financing is a health financing instrument through which payments are made for 
health services to healthcare providers conditional on performance on predefined and verified 
quantity indicators, adjusted for measures of quality.   
What is a rights-based approach to family planning? 
A rights-based approach to family planning uses a set of standards and principles to guide program 
assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation that enables individuals and 
couples to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, to have the 
information and services to do so, and to be treated equitably and free of discrimination. (Erdman & 
Cook, 2008) 
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The paper examines the structure of PBF beyond performance measures and indicators, analyzing the 
language used throughout the implementation manuals, including available memoranda of understanding. 
Additionally, this review identifies gaps where greater attention to client-centered features, most notably 
quality of care, informed choice, and voluntarism, all components of rights-based programming, could 
strengthen PBF operations and offers recommendations for improvements.  
The review begins with (a) a brief overview of PBF and its new support mechanism within the World Bank 
followed by (b) a description of the components of a rights-based approach to FP to provide context for (c) 
the subsequent focus on quality, informed choice, and voluntarism. A companion paper focuses on the 
indicators used in PBF (Boydell et al., 2018).  
The World Bank and other partners have now made extensive use of PBF to deliver FP services among a 
range of instruments and many countries are expanding PBF with the support of the GFF. Although most of 
the documents reviewed pre-date, and in a few cases draw from programs not directly supported by, the 
GFF, this report makes several recommendations to ensure that rights are central to the discussion among 
development partners and governments implementing PBF and related service purchasing strategies. The 
lessons from PBF will have some applicability in other investment instruments and purchasing approaches: 
development impact bonds, Program for Results loans, performance contracting, and national and social 
insurance schemes.  
RESULTS-BASED FINANCING AND THE GLOBAL FINANCING 
FACILITY 
RBF is defined as: 
“A cash payment or nonmonetary transfer made to a national or 
subnational government, manager, provider, payer, or consumer of 
health services after predefined results have been attained and 
verified. Payment is conditional on measurable actions being 
undertaken” (Musgrove, 2011) 
RBF programs are organized such that incentives, typically monetary, are provided to health system actors 
(supply-side) or healthcare consumers (demand-side) in exchange for or in anticipation of targeted behavioral 
changes. A contract outlines the roles of the payer and the recipient as well as the expected outcomes, and the 
reported outcomes are verified by an independent third party before any payments are made. With this 
approach, money for health systems shifts from funding inputs (e.g. salaries and commodities) to paying for 
verifiable outputs achieved through direct service provision or observable health-related consumer behaviors. 
On the supply side, health system actors may receive incentives for high performance or results, i.e. the 
attainment of specified healthcare outputs among the population served. Healthcare consumers, on the other 
hand, might receive incentives for demonstrating positive health behaviors, such as attending health 
education seminars or accessing health services. Consumers may receive vouchers that subsidize access to 
priority services and providers reimbursed for services delivered. These strategies link financial compensation 
to the achievement of health program priorities, with the goal of increasing the use, quality, and efficiency of 
health services. This review focuses on supply-side initiatives that are labeled performance-based financing 
(PBF), which focuses on monetary incentives to healthcare providers for performance under agreed 
conditions.  
Since 2007, PBF for maternal and child health has been supported by the Health Results Innovation Trust 
Fund (HRITF), which is maintained by the governments of Norway and the United Kingdom and 
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administered by the World Bank. It has committed funds through 2022. In 2014, building on the success of 
the HRITF, the UN General Assembly launched the GFF. The GFF partnership aims to provide and 
coordinate additional support and funding explicitly for reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and 
adolescent health (RMNCAH) in the 63 highest-burden low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) (World 
Bank Group, 2014). The GFF has become a flagship mechanism for supporting the provision of RMNCAH 
services, including voluntary FP, in many countries. Through it, PBF is one of the primary means of ensuring 
transparency and accountability (World Bank, 2015).  
The GFF is a move away from traditional bilateral development assistance models towards donor pooling of 
financial resources to promote country-led ownership of RMNCAH. It combines domestic resources with 
financing from both the International Development Association and the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, bilateral donors, other external financing, and private sector resources. 
The GFF Trust Fund is an additional source of funding that increases the volume of financing in order to 
close the estimated US$33.3 billion resource gap for RMNCAH among the countries eligible for GFF 
support, allowing for scale up of priority services (World Bank, 2015). There is renewed emphasis on 
increasing both efficiency in funding and the value for money disbursed. As domestic financing sources 
increase their contributions, it is expected that the need for external grants to recipient countries will be 
reduced. As much as the GFF represents a financing partnership between external donors and domestic 
governments, it also represents a unique opportunity to prospectively strengthen rights principles in the 
design and implementation of GFF-supported health sector investment strategies, particularly PBF programs. 
Early publications on the role of PBF in strengthening FP service provision were mostly primers, toolkits, 
and handbooks developed or funded by the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
These do not explicitly discuss rights-based programming in funding schemes, although the World Bank 
mentions other legal rights related to the receipt of FP services (Loevinsohn, 2008). Eichler and colleagues 
examined country-specific strategies to prevent coercion in the provision of incentivized FP services (Eichler 
et al., 2009). In 2010, evaluations and case studies more openly began to discuss aspects of clients’ rights in 
FP programs under PBF, although they did not use the term “rights.” Two key documents that examined the 
role of incentives in FP services (Eichler et al., 2009, 2010) mentioned voluntarism and informed choice as 
clients’ rights and coincided with the World Bank’s launch of its Reproductive Health Action Plan (2010-
2015), an operationalization of the reproductive health component of its 2009 Health, Nutrition, and 
Population (HNP) Strategy. Yet, the Reproductive Health Action Plan does not explicitly mention rights-
based programming. Instead, it notes that it will focus on strengthening healthcare systems to “ensure access 
to quality family planning and other reproductive health services, skilled birth attendance, emergency obstetric 
care, and postnatal care for mothers and newborns” (World Bank, 2010: 25). While access and quality are 
important components of a rights-based approach, they are two of many rights principles, noted in the 
following section of this paper. In 2013, the World Bank published an HNP paper on the ethical dimensions 
of FP services in RBF programs including PBF initiatives, which explored the risks and responses to 
incentives vis-a-vis FP services. Although it mentioned voluntarism and informed choice, other rights were 
not discussed (Chowdhury et al., 2013).  
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A Rights-Based Approach to Health and 
Family Planning 
A rights-based approach to FP and reproductive health advises the use of rights, rooted in consumers’ 
reproductive desires and needs, as a set of standards and principles to guide program assessment, planning, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. This approach underscores the importance of the individual 
within a broader social and cultural context for FP service delivery (Hardee, Harris, et al., 2014).   
There is increasing consensus that the principles most imperative to voluntary family planning are 
acceptability, accessibility, availability, and quality (commonly referred to as AAAQ), as well as (a) 
accountability, (b) agency, autonomy, and empowerment, (c) equity and non-discrimination, (d) informed 
choice/informed decision-making, (e) participation, and (f) privacy and confidentiality (Family Planning 2020, 
2014; WHO, 2014; UNCESCR, 2000) (table 1). Unique dimensions of voluntarism are found among these 
different principles as well (Kumur et al., 2017; Hardee, Harris, et al., 2014). PBF programs have the potential 
to ensure that clients’ needs for quality services are met through the use of strategic incentives in healthcare 
provision and promote more client-centered healthcare systems.  
Rights Element Implications for family planning programs 
Accessibility 
Geographic, physical, financial, and policy access (i.e., absence of 
nonmedical eligibility criteria); information is available in the 
languages and terms people can understand; continuous 
contraceptive security; suitable hours of operation; service 
integration to increase access 
Acceptability 
Culturally appropriate facilities, methods, and services; 
community/family support for women’s ability to choose, switch, or 
stop method of contraception; tolerance of side effects; privacy and 




Mechanisms exist for community members and FP clients to 
provide input and feedback about services, and for the health 
system to investigate and remedy allegations of/confirmed 
violations of rights; members of the community are involved in 
planning and monitoring FP services; good governance and 
effective implementation, providing an environment that facilitates 
the discharge of all responsibilities; and the ability to readily access 





Knowledge that one has the right to make decisions about 
healthcare; ability to make one’s own decisions independent of 
system, spouse, family, or community pressures; informed, 
voluntary decision-making supported; meaningful participation of 
clients in program design and monitoring; client-controlled methods 
offered; supportive community gender norms; women/men/young 
people know to and ask for services based on their needs, within 
their rights 
Availability Broad choice of methods offered; sufficient and needs-based distribution at functioning service delivery points 
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Informed choice/ 
Informed decision-making 
Women and youth make own decisions about whether and what 
method of FP to use, without pressure from anyone, with free 
access to accurate information they can understand and a range of 
options to choose from 
Non-discrimination/Equity 
Everyone, no matter what group they come from, age, or any other 
circumstance, has the same access to quality information and 
services; everyone is treated fairly and the same 
Quality (including privacy and 
confidentiality) 
Service providers are well trained and provide safe services, treat 
clients with respect, provide good counseling, and protect client 
privacy and confidentiality (ensuring client information cannot be 
observed or heard by anyone else without the client’s consent; 
ensuring client records are not shared with anyone and information 
is not disclosed); and have a regular supply of contraceptives and 
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Review of Country PBF Operational 
Documents 
METHODS 
An evidence mapping of PBF operational documents was undertaken through web search and consultation 
with experts. The aim was to collect and summarize as much evidence as possible and to map results to 
general concepts or research areas (Arksey and O’Malley 2005; Dijkers 2011). Acknowledging that the 
documents were drawn from programs that largely pre-date the GFF, the value of evidence mapping is that it 
is a systematic search extracting from a wide range of materials on specific questions of interest for policy and 
program implementation. 
A review of PBF operational documents was undertaken from November to December 2017. These 
operational documents have programming guidance and tend not to be discoverable through professional 
literature databases and not uniformly available via search engines.  The search focused on the World Bank 
Group’s results-based financing website (https://www.rbfhealth.org), which served as a repository for PBF 
documentation, followed by a request to experts at the PBF Community of Practice Google and Collectivity 
groups to share other documentation of PBF guidance that were not housed on the World Bank website. It 
was not possible to source all expected operational manuals as they were not readily available in the public 
domain. The exploration identified 23 relevant documents (one each from 23 countries) in English and 
French. 
All the documents are the most recent, publicly available versions of operational or implementation manuals. 
From these, we extracted concepts, procedures, and performance measures that specify or reflect the 
principles presented in Table 1.  While the paper focuses on FP-related PBF elements, the extracted data was 
not exclusively focused on FP-specific elements in the documents. For example, the availability of 
commodities is not necessarily specific to contraceptives but potentially inclusive of them. Some of the 
connections between content in the documents and the rights principles are intuited; this reflects the lack of 
clear intent on which some activities or procedures are based, but also provides a foundation for further 
operationalization of a rights-based approach that can ensure high quality services, informed choice, and 
voluntarism in PBF programs. Information from the documents was sorted by the eight principles, or 
groupings thereof, per country, with an additional section for relevant but miscellaneous findings. 
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Findings 
The manuals reviewed were produced between 2009 and 2015, the majority before the creation of the GFF. 
Of the 23 PBF program implementation documents reviewed, 21 manuals mention or include FP. All the 
documents reviewed focused largely on the implementation of quality and accountability mechanisms for the 
financing programs. A few program documents attempted to address issues of accessibility, availability, 
informed choice, acceptability, and non-discrimination/equity. There was no operational inclusion of agency, 
autonomy, empowerment, or voluntarism of healthcare consumers. Table 2 provides an overview of the 
principles that were included in each of the reviewed country PBF operational and implementation manuals. 
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Table 2: Indication of Principles associated with a Rights-based Approach in PBF Operational/Implementation Manuals from 23 LMICs 


































Argentina x  x    x x  
(Cortez, Romero 
Vanina Camporeale, 
& Perez, 2012) 
Armenia   x      x 
(Republic of Armenia 
Ministry of Health, 
2014) 
Benin   x  x   x x 
(République du Bénin 
Ministère de la Santé, 
Secrétariat Général 
du Ministère, & 
Programme de 
Renforcement du 
Système de Santé, 
2014) 
Burkina Faso   x      x 
(Burkina Faso 
Ministere de la Sante, 
2013) 
Burundi   x     x x 
(Republique du 
Burundi Ministere de 
la Sante Publique, 
2010) 
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Djibouti   x     x  
(Republique de 
Djbouti Ministere de 
la Sante, 2014) 
DRC   x     x x 
(Republique 
Democratique du 




Haiti   x     x x 
(République d’Haiti 
Ministere de la Santé 
Publique et de la 
Population, 2013) 
Ivory Coast   x      x 
(République de Cote 
D’Ivoire Ministere de 
la Sante et de la 
Lutte contre le Sida, 
2014) 
Kenya x  x  x   x x 
(The Government of 
Kenya The Ministry of 
Health, 2013) 
Lesotho x x x  x x  x x (Lesotho Ministry of Health, 2013) 
Liberia   x      x 
(Republic of Liberia 
Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare, 
2012) 
Mali   x     x x 
(Republique du Mali 
Ministere de la Sante, 
2011) 
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Nigeria   x  x  x x x 








Ondo State Primary 
Healthcare 
Development Board, 





Rwanda  x x     x x 
(Republic of Rwanda 
Ministry of Health, 
2009) 
Senegal   x    x x x 
(Republique du 
Senegal Ministere de 
la Sante de l’Hygiene 
Publique et de la 
Prevention, 2012) 
Sierra Leone   x  x x  x x (Government of Sierra Leone, 2012) 
Tajikistan   x    x x x 
(Republic of 
Tajikistan Ministry of 
Health and Social 
Protection, 2014) 
Tanzania x x x  x x x x x 
(The United Republic 
of Tanzania Ministry 
of Health and Social 
Welfare, 2015) 
Zambia x  x     x x 
(Zambia Ministry of 
Health & The World 
Bank, 2011) 
TOTAL  
(of 23) 6 4 23 0 6 4 7 19 21  
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A summary of how each of the principles is reflected in the manuals follows. Each subsection begins with the 
definition of the principle, also provided in Table 1, followed by a description of what was captured in the 
operational documents across countries. 
ACCESSIBILITY 
Definition: Geographic, physical, financial, and policy access (i.e., absence of nonmedical eligibility criteria); information 
is available in the languages and terms people can understand; continuous contraceptive security; suitable hours of 
operation; service integration to increase access  
The most forward-looking PBF programs fostered greater access by (a) integrating community health 
extension services, (b) testing financial subsidies, and (c) insisting on a greater customer experience. Six of the 
PBF documents reviewed included issues of accessibility to family planning services or the larger incentivized 
health program. The main dimensions that frame healthcare access in these manuals are physical and 
geographic. Five of the 23 PBF programs included incentives to increase physical access to family planning 
services. In Mozambique’s scheme, not financed by World Bank, health facilities selected for participation in 
its PBF program include peripheral health centers, referral hospitals, and mobile clinics (Institute for 
Collaborative Development, 2015). Lesotho’s health system utilizes village health workers (VHW) as the 
fourth tier of service provision. Under the country’s PBF program, VHWs are trained and used as extensions 
of health centers, conducting services from the Essential Services Package, which includes FP, and reporting 
back to health centers. A component of their health center contracts is that they hire and make use of VHWs 
and VHWs complete their responsibilities. The VHW and health center are considered a unit to which 
incentives are made; payments to VHWs are made based on both their performances and that of their 
respective health centers. The training and deployment of VHWs brings services to more remote areas, 
increasing physical and geographic accessibility of services for hard-to-reach communities (Lesotho Ministry 
of Health, 2013). Similarly, one of Tanzania’s health facility quantity indicators on the country’s PBF 
performance agreement is the number of households visited by community health workers (CHW) (The 
United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2015). Additionally, health providers 
based at more remote health centers in Zambia are incentivized with higher monthly PBF incentives for the 
provision of FP services (Zambia Ministry of Health & World Bank, 2011). Kenya’s PBF operational manual 
for scale up lists an indicator for the number of counties with defined strategies for increasing access and 
utilization of RMNCAH services as a measure tied to incentives, but it does not define a good strategy 
(Government of Kenya Ministry of Health, 2013).  
Two country manuals address economic barriers to accessing healthcare services in their PBF programs. In 
Argentina, there are no client premiums at the points of service, so healthcare is “free” for consumers (Cortez 
et al., 2012). Tanzania’s PBF program seeks information directly from clients regarding the costs of services 
received and whether the client was receiving benefits from the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). Its 
PBF Client Satisfaction Questionnaire asks, “Did you find the cost of care/services financially reasonable and 
affordable to you?” gauging the user’s ability to pay for services (accessibility).  
Information access for healthcare users is not directly incentivized or accounted for in any of the PBF 
documents reviewed.  
In summary, findings were mostly around performance measures used to assess and reward geographic reach, 
and a couple of programs accounted for financial access. These are generally related to expansion of service 
delivery points rather than the recruitment of consumers in those localities. No measures were in place for 
information access for healthcare users, but there are some related indicators captured under “Acceptability”.  
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ACCEPTABILITY 
Definition: Culturally appropriate facilities, methods, and services; community/family support for women’s ability to 
choose, switch, or stop method of contraception; tolerance of side effects; privacy and confidentiality respected; client 
satisfaction with services. 
Four out of the 23 manuals addressed issues of acceptability. Cameroon’s implementation manual has several 
indicators that reflect the desire and need for, and the tolerability of, various FP services among the recipient 
populations. For instance, it counts the total number of old and new FP acceptors currently on oral pills or 
injection, a fairly common FP output indicator that appears across programs, although programs may 
quantify acceptors for different contraceptive methods. Cameroon also collects the number of new cases of 
implants and/or IUDs, post-abortive curettage, and tubal ligation or vasectomies (Consortium 
AEDES/IRESCO, 2012).  
Some of the programs seek to consider client waiting times at health facilities. Cameroon’s PBF verification 
form includes questions about the length of wait times and the client perceptions of wait times – “How did 
the mother appreciate the time?” – while Lesotho asks similar questions and also includes a question about 
whether the wait time had an effect on the client or the child’s health (Consortium AEDES/IRESCO, 2012; 
Lesotho Ministry of Health, 2013). 
Cameroon and Lesotho also give attention to client financial acceptability. Both countries’ verification forms 
include questions about whether and how much money was paid for services and what healthcare users think 
about the payments made (see Tanzania example on affordability under Accessibility). 
Lesotho also made efforts to increase community acceptability, alongside accessibility, by rewarding the 
VHWs for community sensitization outreach. Rwanda’s PBF program similarly incentivizes community 
sensitization via CHWs to encourage healthcare utilization. For FP, CHW outreach seeks to sensitize women 
to benefits of long-term methods and to expand contraceptive options for consumers (Republic of Rwanda 
Ministry of Health, 2009). 
Tanzania gauges clients’ perceptions about the attention and approachability of its health facility providers. 
The Client Satisfaction Questionnaire asks: “When being attended to, were the medical staffs taking time to 
listen to you carefully?” “Was the staff at the facility caring, friendly and welcoming?” and “Did the medical 
staffs at the facility explain matters to you appropriately?” 
In summary, there are performance measures related to new acceptors, community sensitization, and quality; 
and verification related to service appropriateness linked to wait time, costs, and satisfaction with care 
provision. Among the subset of PBF programs to address acceptability, all managed to cover its multiple 
dimensions. 
ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION 
Definition: Mechanisms exist for community members and FP clients to provide input and feedback about services, and 
for health system to investigate and remedy allegations of/confirmed violations of rights; members of the community are 
involved in planning and monitoring FP services; good governance and effective implementation, providing an 
environment that facilitates the discharge of all responsibilities; and the ability to readily access meaningful information, 
including de-identified data 
Given the centrality of contract and verification practices of PBF programs, all the PBF operational manuals 
included accountability measures to ensure appropriate and effective implementation and transparent 
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governance of their respective PBF programs. In addition to the standard third-party verifications required by 
the RPBF model, countries such as Afghanistan, Argentina, Benin, and Kenya also conduct internal audits 
regularly over the course of the year. Many of the countries require routine work plans, often quarterly, that 
inform continuous monitoring and evaluation plans. Monitoring and evaluation activities are common among 
many of the reviewed program manuals. Additionally, many programs request business plans from levels as 
high as the ministries in charge down to the implementing health facilities, often updated on a regular basis; 
as well as systematic monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual performance reports due to and from different 
entities. 
The roles and responsibilities of personnel were also dictated in the operations manuals. Most countries 
highlighted a separation of power and functions for managing the PBF programs, seemingly to insure against 
the perception of containing power by a few or at one level of authority. Some countries convened 
coordination or steering committees to guide and supervise the implementation of PBF programs. 
Afghanistan, Armenia, and Djibouti are among those countries, each of which specifies the tasks for each 
group. Additionally, other roles were plainly set and defined. Kenya overtly distinguished between the 
regulator, fund holder, purchaser, internal and external verifiers, and service providers. Liberia and Nigeria 
also provided similar levels of detail. 
Given the financial rewards provided by PBF programs, some programs defined possible penalties. Benin, 
Nigeria, and Kenya all spoke to the potential for sanctions around issues such as fraud or negligence, mostly 
at the service provision level. It was interesting to note the absence of sanctions for fraud at higher 
administrative levels.  
Client participation in accountability measures was also significant across program designs. Most of the 
verification processes include client satisfaction surveys to ensure that services were indeed provided and to 
consider how fulfilling the experience was for healthcare users. In addition to in-person surveys and 
interviews, Sierra Leone also has a hospital level indicator for “management of patients’ complaints and 
suggestion box,” making it possible for more anonymous feedback. 
In summary, there are extensive and robust accountability systems with penalties and sanctions built into PBF 
programs. Structures are in place to ensure responsibilities are set out, discharged, verified, and rewarded or 
penalized.  However, these are mostly upward-oriented accountability systems to ensure system performance. 
There is little reference to consumer and community participation and feedback mechanisms, whether 
suggestion boxes, hearings, or health committees.  
AGENCY/AUTONOMY/EMPOWERMENT/VOLUNTARISM 
Definition: Knowledge that one has the right to make decisions about healthcare; ability to make one’s own decisions 
independent of system, spouse, family, or community pressures; informed, voluntary decision-making supported; 
meaningful participation of clients in program design and monitoring; client-controlled methods offered; supportive 
community gender norms; women/men/young people know to and ask for services based on their needs, within their 
rights. 
While there was discussion of autonomy in terms of PBF programs giving more agency to health service 
actors at points of service, there was no discussion of client agency or autonomy in any of the reviewed PBF 
operational documents. The distinction is an important point to make in discussing rights to agency, 
autonomy, empowerment and voluntarism.  A program design that supports access to client-controlled 
methods does not signal the existence of these (unspoken) rights in that program. An explicit 
acknowledgment of a client’s right to agency, autonomy, empowerment, and voluntarism is needed to ensure 
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that program implementers are (a) aware of these rights and (b) understand why client-controlled methods or 
other rights-enhancing attributes in the PBF program are important for effective FP service delivery.  
AVAILABILITY 
Definition: Broad choice of methods offered; sufficient and needs-based distribution at functioning service delivery points. 
Only six of the 23 country documents addressed the principle of availability. Of these programs, there was a 
focus on the availability of commodities, and several programs reported available personnel skilled in the 
provision of specific services.  
In Benin, commodities are measured, inspected, and verified by ministry inspectors and community-based 
representatives. Nigeria also has indicators for the availability and visibility of FP methods; for having an 
“adequate” stock of pills, injectables, implants, and IUDs; and for vasectomies and tubal ligations. Lesotho’s 
PBF manual plainly states indicators for “at least five IUDs and five implants available” and “at least three 
months’ stock of oral and injectable contraceptives”. Sierra Leone includes the availability of vital and tracer 
drugs and consumables as well as stock out delays as hospital indicators. Inventory records and summary 
reports are also listed as hospital indicators related to the availability of commodities. In Tanzania’s program, 
verification includes direct observation of rooms used for FP services and the supplies for six contraceptive 
methods. Additionally, Tanzania and Lesotho also verify availability through client questionnaires. The 
Lesotho manual asks, “Were the medicines prescribed for you available at the hospital?” while Tanzania’s 
asks, “Have you ever gone home without medication because they were out of stock?” 
Many of the operational documents spoke to measuring the numbers of trained and working staff. Lesotho’s 
program requires at least one trained staff member for each implant method and for IUD insertion, and it 
also has a staff performance measure of “never absent from service without known or valid motive.” 
Likewise, Sierra Leone has a “cross-cutting quality adjustment criteri[on]” of attendance at work. Tanzania’s 
program has a broader indicator for providers than Lesotho’s, measuring the availability of trained FP 
providers through their quality assessment tool for dispensaries and health centers. In Kenya, alongside 
counting the number of qualified staff employed by health facilities and deployed in each of its counties, the 
program also counts the number of counties implementing a community-based RMNCAH strategy, the 
number of counties with defined strategies for increasing access and utilization of RMNCAH services, and 
the percentage of counties fully implementing those strategies (also see Accessibility). 
In summary, there are a range of performance indicators related to the availability of supplies in addition to 
some quality and verification procedures. There are also indicators and procedures to ensure an adequate 
distribution of appropriately trained staff. However, there was limited discussion on the importance of 
measuring method mix, which is critical metric underlying functional consumer choice.  
INFORMED CHOICE/INFORMED DECISION-MAKING 
Definition: Women and youth make own decisions about whether and what method of FP to use, without pressure from 
anyone, with free access to accurate information they can understand and a range of options to choose from. 
Four PBF operational manuals address issues of informed choice. Tanzania’s program states that it included 
questions about informed choice around FP methods in its client exit interviews, conducted at random within 
health facilities. The country’s quality and verification questions include: 
§ “What methods were you taught? [Must be able to name 3 of the following: condoms, injectables, 
pills, implants, IUCDs]”; and  
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§ “Did you receive your method of choice or advised which methods were appropriate for you 
following examination today? If not, were you provided information on where you could receive the 
method, or referred to a facility or outreach service where the method is provided?” 
The questions are scored 1 point for a “yes” response and 0 or 1 point for a “no” response. 
Cameroon’s household survey form used for service verification asks if a price list was displayed in the health 
facility and if the health staff explained and presented all the existing modern methods to the client and 
allowed her to choose one freely. Similarly, Lesotho measures whether and which FP methods (injections, 
implants, IUDs, pills, male and female condoms) were available for demonstrations to clients. Further, Sierra 
Leone’s PBF program expects direct observations and reports about the organization of health education 
sessions and information provided to patients, “including patient circuit for getting services, schedules.” 
In summary, there were performance and quality measures as well as verification procedures assessing and 
rewarding whether and how much information was shared. However, only the Tanzania PBF program 
attempted to assess if the information was understood by consumers. 
NON-DISCRIMINATION/EQUITY 
Definition: Everyone, no matter what group they come from, age, or any other circumstance, has the same access to 
quality information and services; everyone is treated fairly and the same 
Four of the 23 PBF manuals addressed equity and nondiscrimination standards within their programs. Three 
of the four were concerned with reaching groups based on income or wealth scores, and one was concerned 
with indigenous groups.  
Afghanistan is utilizing an equity of care concentration index, in which a score of zero indicates equal 
utilization of services by all wealth groups, a negative number indicates that lower income groups are utilizing 
services at higher rates, and a positive number indicates that wealthier groups are utilizing services more. This 
is measured at the provincial level along with the contraceptive prevalence rate, whereas all other indicators 
for the country’s PBF program are measured at the health facility level. Funds are similarly paid at the 
provincial level for achievements related to these indicators (Operations Manual: Results Based Financing 
Intervention in BPHS Facilities and Hospitals in Afghanistan, n.d.). 
PBF programs in Nigeria and Tanzania are also focused on low-income groups. The Nigeria PBF program 
takes place at the state level with the parastatal state primary healthcare development agency (SPHCDA) 
acting as the purchaser. The SPHCDA incentivizes household visits and providing allowable free healthcare 
for select impoverished populations. Its indicators include a category labeled “new consultation for an 
indigent patient,” signifying that the poorest people can access health services without service fees (Federal 
Ministry of Health et al., 2013). Tanzania is prioritizing enrolling regions with poor health outcomes and 
higher poverty indices in its PBF program. One indicator measures the number of low-income individuals (a) 
registered in its system, (b) attending, and (c) receiving outpatient services during a defined period (The 
United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2015). 
In a different way, Argentina is incentivizing the increase of coverage to indigenous populations. Coverage is 
indicated by the number of providers who deliver services to eligible indigenous populations, with personnel 
trained in specific cultures and health needs (Cortez et al., 2012). 
In summary, there are indications that some PBF programs are attempting to assess and reward providers’ 
performance based on income and/or ethnicity of consumers. However, there was no discussion of other 
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forms of social disadvantage that are known to affect access to family planning for other underserved or 
disadvantaged groups, such as youth.  
QUALITY, INCLUDING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
Definition: Service providers are well trained and provide safe services, treat clients with respect, provide good counseling, 
and protect client privacy and confidentiality (ensuring client information cannot be observed or heard by anyone else 
without the client’s consent; ensuring client records are not shared with anyone and information is not disclosed); and a 
regular supply of contraceptives and all necessary equipment to provide the services clients want. 
Nineteen of the 23 PBF operational manuals explicitly mention quality at least once, if not throughout the 
document. Some manuals simply state that they will monitor and verify quality of care and quality control of 
processes (Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda). Others, such as Argentina 
and Cameroon, demarcate quality. Argentina’s Plan Nacer states that the five dimensions of quality are (1) 
enrollment, (2) knowledge of benefit plans, (3) first-level attention and hospitalization assessment, (4) nurse 
and doctor assessment, and (5) utilization of system complaints. Cameroon’s PBF program identifies two 
types of quality standards: (1) a minimal threshold of quality standards for output payment and (2) a 
minimum adequate level of quality standards to be eligible for a quality bonus. Mali’s PBF Procedure Manual 
states that its PBF objective is to improve the quality and quantity of long-acting reversible contraceptives 
and prenatal and antenatal care; quality is the program’s overarching mission. 
Among the 19 manuals that discuss quality, the degree to which quality is operationalized varies. Some 
manuals detail internal processes to monitor and evaluate quality, which are distinct from external verification 
procedures outlined in several manuals. For example, Benin’s program requires a commitment to regular 
quality evaluations of health facilities that will be conducted by health inspectors and regular evaluations of 
quality of care provided by community-based volunteers. Sierra Leone will also conduct quality assessments 
on the maintenance of appropriate standards of cleanliness, cleaning of facilities, hygiene, and sanitation 
indicators. In Zambia, to avoid incentivized indicators becoming the centerpiece to the detriment of all other 
health indicators, the non-incentivized indicators will also be routinely monitored. The aim is to ensure that 
improvements in indicators are comprehensive and not biased towards those that are incentivized. This is 
monitored with a Quality Audit by the District or General Hospital, and FP indicators are included and 
weighted. 
As well, many of the PBF manuals included or referenced quality assessments or assurance checklists. These 
checklists tally scores to quantify levels of quality and service readiness in line with national standards, 
although few countries offered a conceptual definition of quality in their manuals.  
Patient satisfaction is also endorsed as a dimension of quality across PBF programs (also see Accountability). 
Cameroon’s household survey form for verification asks, “Was the mother well received in the health 
facility?” In Tanzania, the quality assessment tools for dispensaries and health centers list a patient satisfaction 
survey as part of its verification process. Most of the other countries also include patient satisfaction surveys 
among their verification tools, but they are not necessarily listed on the quality assessment scales.  
There are many indicators of quality in PBF implementation, many captured under acceptability, accessibility, 
and availability. Three other dimensions of quality are (1) technical competencies, (2) facility readiness, and (3) 
privacy and confidentiality. Quality checklists in Nigeria were updated for PBF programming to give greater 
weight to the content of healthcare, namely staff competency and performance. In Tanzania, client FP cards 
are randomly selected to check whether the clients were correctly examined and counseled on FP methods 
and choice. Cameroon checks for whether all FP consultations are carried out by at least one Brevete (French 
for “qualified” or “patented”) nurse in health centers and whether there is at least one State registered nurse 
 
20 | RESEARCH REPORT 
trained in FP at hospitals. In Lesotho, quality of work is a measure of staff performance. Its checklist enquires 
if staff are "adhering to specific work-related norms and standards.” PBF also dictates that health centers are 
required to have at least three qualified staff, per ministry of health (MOH) guidelines, and that buildings and 
equipment meet MOH standards (including the availability of water, and electricity or solar power). For 
Kenya’s PBF program, it is important that health workers correctly calculate the target population for FP 
services and that staff are trained on screening. Similarly, Cameroon’s program clearly states that it expects 
health staff to make accurate calculations of the expected monthly targets for IUD, tubal ligations, and 
vasectomies. 
Facility preparedness or readiness is also a frequent measure of quality. Kenya’s program checks whether a 
facility is ready to provide FP by verifying the level of contraceptive stock (injectables, orals, implants, 
condoms, and IUCDs). In Lesotho, monitoring and verification of whether clinical equipment (scales, 
sphygmomanometer, specula, lights, gloves, disinfectants/decontaminants, Ayre's spatula, cervical brushes, 
slides and fixatives, and IUD insertion kits) is available and working is within the PBF plan. Cameroon 
includes many preparedness indicators on its quality assessment checklists, and while there are distinct 
checklists for health centers and hospitals, there are some shared measures between the two: (a) the presence 
of a wall chart, picture book, or flip chart with demonstrations of different modern FP methods (see 
Acceptability); (b) an existing security stock of oral and injectable contraceptives; (c) at least five IUD 
methods and at least five Norplan available and staff capable of placing them; (d) a strategy in place to refer 
couples for tubal ligation and/or vasectomy (see Availability); (e) the availability of an FP register that is well-
filled and current; (f) completion of all rubrics; and (g) the availability of completed FP forms (blood pressure, 
weight, vericose [sic] veins). Cameroon’s hospital quality checklist also looks for whether the hospital business 
plan has a “convincing strategy to cover family planning,” which should include the (a) integration of hospital 
staff, (b) collaboration with the private sector and the community relays agents, and (c) an outreach strategy 
and advocacy with traditional or local leaders. 
Privacy and/or confidentiality were often mentioned repeatedly across country manuals. Assurances of 
privacy and confidentiality are indicated by the PBF programs in Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, and Tanzania. 
These principles are measured by individual service provision and full privacy during the service in Tanzania, 
ensuring consultation spaces are available, windows, blinds, or curtains in Cameroon and Kenya, no direct 
passage between rooms through which other people might have to walk in Cameroon, non-transparent glass 
in Kenya, and rooms with closed doors in all countries. 
In summary, alongside technical competency, facility readiness, privacy, and confidentiality, which are all 
aspects of quality, the ways PBF programs define and measure quality overlap other principles, most notably 
accessibility, acceptability, and availability (see relevant subsections). What is unique about quality is that it is 
often explicitly built into program operations through the quality checklist and performance metrics.  Across 
the operational manuals, dimensions of quality are captured in performance and quality measures, rewards, 
and verification procedures. 
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Discussion 
Placing people and their needs at the center of the design and implementation of PBF health programs is the 
cornerstone of a rights-based approach and doing so promotes health equity. PBF utilizes incentives, often 
monetary, to encourage good practices in healthcare delivery and utilization. Focusing attention on quality of 
care, informed choice, and voluntarism within the context of a rights-based approach to PBF could help to 
encourage positive behaviors by health sector actors and counterbalance the risk of perverse and unintended 
outcomes.  
Health systems’ administration and programming must align and further governments’ responsibilities to their 
citizens.  Expanding accountability mechanisms within PBF programs can strengthen the health systems 
governance by including the voice of clients and communities, increasingly the likelihood that their needs are 
fully met through PBF programming.  This is particularly interesting as ministries of health and finance are 
government agencies and are often chief managers of PBF programs. Improved governance of health systems 
might improve the quality of healthcare and simultaneously expand effective health services to more people.  
Recent publications have called for rethinking PBF verification to reduce the risk of harming consumers PBF 
is intended to serve. Thinkwell co-founder Yogesh Rajkotia argues that “international development doesn’t 
care about patient privacy” as he described how he saw PBF verification processes undermining patient 
privacy and confidentiality (Rajkotia, 2018). Another report argues that PBF implementation was hastily and 
poorly integrated into health systems, failing to attend to necessary long-term, systemwide reforms, such as 
working conditions for human resources, transparency, and accountability (Paul et al., 2018b). These calls for 
reform align with GFF’s own recommendations to incorporate a dynamic risk assessment, greater privacy and 
patient confidentiality, and anticipate indicator verification in the design phase of program development 
(Vergeer et al, 2016). There is a well-recognized need for purposive incorporation of rights principles into 
PBF design to both fortify and legitimize the PBF strategy in the development space. 
CURRENT STATE OF PRINCIPLES RELATED TO A RIGHTS-BASED 
APPROACH IN PBF IMPLEMENTATION 
Although specific principles are upheld in PBF operational manuals, across the manuals reviewed there is 
inconsistent inclusion of principles for a rights-based approach to PBF programs. Only one program, 
Argentina’s Plan Nacer, directly spoke to protecting or championing the rights of FP, or any healthcare, 
clients. All the countries advance the essence of at least one of the principles in their targets, monitoring, and 
rewards; and some are aligned with multiple principles. However, PBF programs generally do not employ a 
rights-based approach to health program development and service delivery. Based on this scoping review, 
PBF operational documents at the country level do not explicitly incorporate a rights-based framework, but 
they address specific principles in the design and implementation of PBF programs. Those principles 
generally measured by PBF programs tend to be those that are easier to observe, making them more 
quantifiable and amenable for data collection by health service actors and verification parties. For instance, 
the number of low-income service users or the number of service delivery points in hard-to-reach locations 
are countable and verifiable.  
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GAPS IN INCLUSION OF PRINCIPLES RELATED TO AN RBA IN PBF 
PROGRAMS 
Partial recognition of rights principles 
Except for the principle of agency, all the principles are included to some extent across the reviewed 
documents, but most principles are only narrowly addressed. For instance, physical dimensions of 
accessibility were addressed in a few programs, but there was little to no emphasis on financial or information 
dimensions of accessibility. Under the right to non-discrimination and the principle of equity, disadvantage 
and discrimination due to income and ethnicity were addressed, yet an important dimension of disadvantage, 
namely adolescence, was neglected.  This section highlights gaps in the inclusion of three principles among 
the PBF manuals reviewed.   
Absence of the Principle of Agency 
In the operations manuals, the only principle strikingly absent was that of agency, which was grouped with 
autonomy, empowerment, and voluntarism for this review. Agency implies people know their right to make 
FP decisions and can make their own decisions about contraceptive use.  It should be noted, however, that 
the definitions for these principles intersect; and informed choice/informed decision-making, for which there 
was some inclusion, albeit minimal, focused on the provision of comprehensive FP information to help 
clients with decision making. These principles, while discussed with regard for family planning, are imperative 
to all healthcare programs. Clients should be active and engaged participants in their healthcare use. In the 
case of family planning, clients must make voluntary, informed decisions about contraceptive use, for which 
the principle of agency is critical. 
Lack of Downward Accountability 
Accountability was the only principle addressed by every PBF implementation manual reviewed. However, 
most of the accountability systems are internal, horizontal performance systems that are explained in detail 
for PBF verification purposes, connecting health service actors to PBF regulators and funders. The manuals 
focus largely on the major players in supply-side PBF schemes, (a) funders, (b) regulators/verifiers, and (c) 
health service providers, and the contracts among and between these agents. The implementation manuals 
and contracts concentrate on the roles and responsibilities of each as well as the contracted services that are 
eligible for financial reward. They do not discuss how healthcare users should be or are expected to be 
included in and served by the health system. In this way, there was negligible inclusion of downward 
accountability to clients. The responsibility of health programs to clients is determined through (a) client 
surveys, (b) exit interviews, (c) verification observations, and (d) reviews of various facility registers for very 
few and specific details, such as whether the client was truly served by a facility. As such, accountability 
measures in current PBF implementation documents do not speak to accountability to the communities 
served, which would require client and community participation in program design and implementation 
beyond satisfaction surveys. 
Incomplete notion of quality 
Quality, a principal performance measure in PBF, provides an interesting challenge for many PBF programs 
because its definition is broad and subjective, and its performance measures remain confusing. Additionally, 
other principles (accessibility, availability, and acceptability) can overlap to some degree with notional aspects 
of quality. It would be helpful if quality in PBF was based on a clearly-defined theoretical framework. For 
more than 25 years, the FP field has been guided by the Bruce FP Quality of Care (QOC) Framework (Bruce, 
1990). Recently, Jain has proposed a revision of the FP QOC Framework (see Box 1) that aligns it with 
definitions of quality of care in frameworks for rights-based FP (WHO, 2014; FP2020, 2014; Hardee et al., 
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2014).  This revised FP QOC framework could serve this purpose.  The PBF implementation manuals tend 
to focus more on supply-side quality (largely not from the consumer experience) and do not explain the 
selection of quality indicators included in the country manual.  
Focus on supply over demand 
Finally, the PBF implementation manuals reviewed focused on supply-side financial incentives and RBF 
“encompasses the entire range of incentive approaches on both the demand and the supply sides” (Fritsche, 
Soeters, & Meessen, 2014). While there are programs inclusive of or focused on demand-side schemes, these 
were not presented in the reviewed manuals. Demand-side programs are important for their focus on the 
barriers and constraints faced by the consumers trying to access desired services. They are, therefore, more 
directly responsive to consumer needs than programs aimed at health system strengthening and performance.  
  
Box 1: Revised FP Quality of Care Framework 
 
Structure (quality of services or readiness of services to provide intended level of care) 
¨ Choice of methods  
¨ Availability of the appropriate number and type of methods  
¨ Required equipment to provide the range of methods  
¨ Availability of space to ensure audio and visual privacy 
¨ Availability of appropriate constellation of reproductive health services 
¨ Availability of trained/competent provider in: 
o Providing contraceptive methods safely by ensuring compliance with correct medical 
procedures and infection prevention practices 
o Treating clients with dignity and respect 
o Appropriate information exchange with clients  
 
Process (quality of care offered to clients and received by them) 
¨ Appropriate information exchange with clients to ensure:   
o Selection of a method appropriate to client’s needs and circumstances by soliciting 
information from them about their reproductive intentions, family circumstances, 
prior use of contraception, and preferred method; and by providing information on 
alternate methods appropriate to their needs 
o Effective contraceptive use by informing clients about such items as how to use the 
method selected, potential side effects and how to manage them if they occur 
o Continuity of care and contraceptive use by informing clients when to come back for 
resupply and possibility of switching the method, provider, or service outlet 
whenever the selected method/provider/outlet does not remain suitable 
¨ Interpersonal relations including: 
o Treating clients with dignity and respect 
o Ensuring audio and visual privacy and confidentiality  
 
Source: Jain and Hardee, 2018 
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Limitations 
This report has been limited to the review of country-specific operations manuals for PBF programs. It does 
not include a full review of other PBF operational documents developed by nongovernmental agencies, 
which may have sourced different data or outlined other implementation approaches. Additionally, not all 
existing PBF operations or implementation manuals have been reviewed. Only those sourced through web 
searches and expert consultations in 2017 were included. 
Other resources like project appraisal documents (PAD) and investment cases (IC) may illuminate whether 
geographic targeting was based on equity considerations. From conversations with one GFF representative, it 
seems as if this may be the case in some country investments. In an internal review of PADs and IC 
documents prior to reviewing the 23 implementation manuals, Population Council researchers did not locate 
discussions of equity targeting; however, further research is warranted if only to surface evidence of rights 
principles is existing documents and acknowledge the past efforts in this regard. 
This evidence mapping of PBF operational documents sorted current PBF design and implementation 
elements according to the selected rights principles. As PBF aligns with the wider interest in strategic 
purchasing in universal health coverage and is a technical strategy for which countries increasingly seek GFF 
support, systematically incorporating rights principles into PBF program design beforehand becomes an ever 
greater priority.  
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Recommendations and Conclusion 
A significant share of the technical support in designing PBF programs is administered by the World Bank 
and funded by contributing governments that have signed on to international agreements to ensure citizens 
the right to the highest attainable standard of health. The review identified a need for a clearer articulation 
and prioritization of all principles to a rights-based approach throughout the PBF lifecycle, from investment 
cases to PADs and into PBF operational manuals and program tools. What is currently missing in the PBF 
programs is a client orientation. There is a particular need for more attention on agency, informed choice, and 
availability, which were absent or poorly represented in this evidence mapping. All rights principles should be 
clearer and consistent throughout countries’ PBF programs and included in how country requests for support 
are assessed by GFF and partners. Relevant guidance materials ought to be developed to sensitize and 
support country teams when developing PBF programs. Using the existing documentation from FP2020 
would be a good start for this (http://www.familyplanning2020.org/microsite/rightsinfp). Core indicators 
14-16 at FP2020’s Track20 can be considered for assessment and potentially for rewarding performance.  
Current PBF guidance lacks a right principles framework and could draw from FP communities of practice to 
develop a practical implementation scheme oriented toward client rights. The PBF theory of change is framed 
as an empowering, equitable, efficient, and effective approach to strengthening health systems, yet in the 
operational guidance, it often focuses on empowerment and autonomy of the provider and facility; a similarly 
strong emphasis on the client is needed for better health outcomes.  
The review notes that most of the implementation manuals identified here were developed prior to the 
establishment of the GFF. The GFF Business Plan declares that “equity, gender, and rights underpin and are 
mainstreamed throughout the GFF’s work” and that country ownership and guidance are some of its guiding 
principles. As such, the GFF provides an opportunity for a renewed, concerted focus on integrating rights 
principles into PBF design, as it influences agent behavior in a classic principal-agent arrangement. Under 
PBF in the health sector, agents are often the facility-based providers, and to some extent the district 
administration. Just as governments are expected to work towards the progressive realization of their citizens’ 
rights, an iterative learning process is critical to operationalizing a rights-based PBF program.  
Some important questions have been addressed by this evidence mapping; gaps with respect to particular 
rights principles have been identified. A second report from the same research effort explores the rights-
based approach to PBF indicators for FP services. Both reports provide an assessment of the state of rights 
principles articulation and operationalization in PBF programs for FP services.  
From the results presented here, there is a clear opportunity for future operations manuals to more explicitly 
and systematically address rights principles. How rights principles are incorporated into implementation will 
require a thoughtful, iterative approach that documents the efforts made while accounting for contextual 
variation. Determining the programmatic structure of a fully operational rights-based approach in any PBF 
program is guided by international agreement on a rights principles framework for family planning programs 
as well as local stakeholder contextualization in the respective health system. 
Going forward, PBF operations manuals ought to summarize their PBF theory of change from a rights-based 
approach to implementation. Given its centrality to funding through the GFF partners, PBF for FP services 
will have significant implications on the abilities of women and couples to choose if, when, and how many 
children to bear in their lifetimes. Placing consumers at the heart of services and ensuring they are always 
prioritized and protected when designing, planning, and implementing PBF programs is critical to ensuring 
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that people are able to make their own decisions about FP use and to sustaining PBF programs, particularly in 
countries supported by GFF. 
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